The UK’s battle against financial crime took center stage with the conviction of an ex-Janus Henderson analyst, Redinel Korfuzi, and his sister for a sophisticated money laundering and insider dealing scheme. Their case, which ultimately revealed over £1 million in illegal proceeds, demonstrates how modern investment professionals can exploit privileged access for personal gain and highlights how money laundering remains a persistent risk across the financial services sector.

Money Laundering Techniques Unveiled by Ex-Janus Henderson Analyst Case

The journey from illicit gain to laundered wealth in the ex-Janus Henderson analyst’s case followed a pattern that will be familiar to compliance professionals, yet the scale and structure made it stand out. While working at Janus Henderson Investors, the analyst regularly accessed confidential information about listed companies. This privileged position allowed the ex-Janus Henderson analyst to predict market movements before public announcements, giving a significant, unlawful advantage.

Between December 2019 and March 2021, the ex-Janus Henderson analyst, working in concert with his sister, used this information to trade in the shares of at least 13 companies. Their preferred vehicle for these trades was Contracts for Difference (CFDs), which allowed them to take short positions and close them after adverse market announcements. Importantly, the trades were executed not through the analyst’s own accounts but via accounts held by his sister, an acquaintance, and the acquaintance’s partner. These arrangements were deliberately designed to obscure the ex-Janus Henderson analyst’s involvement, spreading both activity and risk across multiple actors and platforms.

Detection did not come easily. The scheme was only uncovered through the Financial Conduct Authority’s (FCA) robust market surveillance and monitoring systems, which spotted anomalies in trading patterns that did not align with typical market behavior. Even as efforts were made to avoid detection by splitting trades and profits, the FCA’s systems flagged the irregularities, leading to a deeper investigation.

Beyond the insider dealing aspect, money laundering emerged as a critical concern. From January 2019 to March 2021, the ex-Janus Henderson analyst and his sister made 176 cash deposits totaling nearly £200,000, all unrelated to the insider trading. The frequency and amounts were inconsistent with known income streams and drew further suspicion. These deposits were typical of “placement” in the classic three-stage money laundering process, where illicit funds are introduced into the financial system in a manner designed to avoid reporting thresholds and trigger points.

Once deposited, these funds were layered using transfers between accounts, some held offshore or in the names of unrelated parties. The ultimate aim was to integrate the laundered cash, blending illicit proceeds with legitimate assets and obscuring any direct links to criminal activity. The complexity and range of methods used by the ex-Janus Henderson analyst highlight the sophistication of today’s money laundering schemes and the need for advanced detection by both institutions and regulators.

How UK Law Targets Money Laundering by Financial Professionals

The UK has developed one of the world’s most comprehensive anti-money laundering (AML) regimes, underpinned by the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA), the Money Laundering Regulations 2017, and the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA). For ex-Janus Henderson analysts and others with access to sensitive market information, these laws not only prohibit insider trading but also criminalize the act of concealing or disguising proceeds derived from such offenses.

POCA, in particular, creates several money laundering offences that capture both direct actions, such as moving illicit money, and indirect acts like facilitating transfers or failing to report suspicious activities. The ex-Janus Henderson analyst’s pattern of frequent, structured cash deposits and use of third-party accounts demonstrated clear attempts at layering and integration, in direct violation of these statutes.

The FCA, as the UK’s primary conduct regulator for financial services, has developed sophisticated surveillance technologies to spot suspicious activity. For investment professionals, especially those in research or trading roles, this means increased scrutiny of both trading and personal banking activities. The ex-Janus Henderson analyst’s trades, which appeared linked to non-public information and were rapidly followed by profit-taking and subsequent cash movements, fell into a high-risk typology that the FCA’s systems are specifically designed to detect.

Financial firms are required by law to implement robust AML frameworks, including:

• Customer due diligence (CDD) and enhanced due diligence (EDD) for high-risk customers or transactions
• Ongoing transaction monitoring to spot unusual activity, both in trading and personal accounts
• Immediate filing of suspicious activity reports (SARs) to the National Crime Agency (NCA) when illicit activity is suspected
• Regular staff training, particularly for those with market access or authority

The ex-Janus Henderson analyst’s case exemplifies why compliance teams must stay vigilant even with their own staff. Monitoring should extend beyond basic onboarding checks and cover patterns of behavior, unexplained income, and trading that appears inconsistent with the individual’s role or declared wealth.

Red Flags and Typologies in the Ex-Janus Henderson Analyst’s Money Laundering

Cases like that of the ex-Janus Henderson analyst offer a stark reminder of how AML typologies evolve and the importance of continuous adaptation in the face of new tactics. Several key red flags emerged during the FCA’s investigation:

• Trading via third-party accounts: By executing trades through his sister and acquaintances, the ex-Janus Henderson analyst tried to distance himself from both trading activity and profits.
• Frequent, small cash deposits: The sheer number and pattern of deposits were designed to avoid detection, yet still represented significant sums over time.
• Layering through multiple accounts: Money was moved repeatedly, sometimes to offshore entities, in a classic attempt to break the audit trail.
• Unexplained increases in wealth: Discrepancies between declared income and actual expenditure, especially on luxury goods and high-value assets.
• CFD usage to maximize and hide gains: CFDs allow for leveraged bets and quick liquidation, providing both anonymity and speed to money launderers.

For asset management firms and financial institutions, the lesson is clear: modern money laundering schemes are highly adaptable. The ex-Janus Henderson analyst was able to exploit personal relationships, gaps in inter-account monitoring, and the rapid movement of digital assets to try to conceal illicit profits.

AML Compliance Lessons for the Investment Sector

The conviction of the ex-Janus Henderson analyst is more than an individual cautionary tale. It underscores the pressing need for investment firms to strengthen their AML and surveillance protocols. Some best practices highlighted by this case include:

• Integration of AML and market abuse monitoring: Siloed approaches to compliance risk missing the intersection where market abuse feeds directly into money laundering.
• Enhanced scrutiny of employees with market access: Those with access to non-public information should be subject to ongoing reviews of both their trading activity and personal finances.
• Leveraging advanced analytics: The FCA’s detection systems used pattern recognition and data analytics to spot unusual trading and cash movement. Firms must invest in similar technologies and maintain up-to-date detection algorithms.
• Staff training and whistleblowing: Employees should be educated not just on the law but on the practical warning signs of financial crime. Safe whistleblowing channels should be readily available.
• Cross-institutional collaboration: Sharing intelligence, both within firms and with regulators, enables a holistic approach to risk and supports the identification of complex schemes that span multiple platforms.

The ex-Janus Henderson analyst’s money laundering also demonstrates that illicit activity often stretches beyond a single firm or department, involving family members and acquaintances who may not themselves understand the full extent of the criminal plan. This makes proactive, holistic risk management and the use of behavioral analytics all the more critical.

The Industry Impact: Sentencing and Confiscation as Deterrents

Following the conviction of the ex-Janus Henderson analyst and his sister, the next steps include sentencing and the pursuit of confiscation orders. These actions are essential in sending a strong signal to the industry: financial crime will not only be prosecuted but will result in the recovery of illicit gains wherever possible.

The ex-Janus Henderson analyst’s scheme ran for years before detection, but the response by regulators demonstrates the growing power of technology and international cooperation in financial crime enforcement. The acquittal of two other individuals involved, Rogerio de Aquino and Dema Almeziad, highlights the importance of concrete evidence linking individuals to core activities, and also the complexity of proving intent and participation in multi-layered crimes.

For firms employing professionals in similar roles, it is crucial to recognize that regulatory focus has shifted. Authorities now expect investment companies to maintain active surveillance over both trading and financial flows, with the ability to swiftly escalate and report concerns.

Conclusion: The Enduring Risk of Money Laundering in Financial Markets

The case of the ex-Janus Henderson analyst demonstrates that even regulated environments and highly professional firms remain at risk from insider-driven money laundering. It serves as a reminder that effective AML controls depend on more than just box-ticking; they require continuous investment, adaptation, and vigilance.

By keeping AML and market abuse controls tightly interwoven, applying the latest analytical tools, and maintaining a culture of transparency, financial firms can better protect themselves and the broader market. For the ex-Janus Henderson analyst and others tempted to abuse their position, the consequences are now clearer than ever: the combination of insider dealing and money laundering can, and will, be met with robust regulatory action, asset seizure, and significant criminal penalties.

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Related Links

• UK Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA)
• FCA – Market Abuse Regulation
• Money Laundering Regulations 2017
• National Crime Agency – Money Laundering
• Financial Services and Markets Act 2000

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Source: FCA

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