Mexico’s recent move to restrict access to its cross-border anti-money laundering (AML) information marks a pivotal turn in the country’s approach to financial crime compliance and global cooperation. After more than a decade of open reporting, the Financial Intelligence Unit (UIF) has, for the first time since 2013, withheld detailed statistics about international information exchanges related to money laundering and terrorist financing. This unexpected change coincides with heightened regulatory attention from the United States and signals a potentially significant shift in the region’s financial crime landscape.
Table of Contents
Money Laundering Information Exchange: Mexico’s Role and Recent Changes
The fight against money laundering in Mexico is deeply entwined with international information-sharing agreements. For years, Mexico’s UIF, under the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP), played an active and transparent role in the global AML network, regularly publishing the number and scope of information requests both received and sent. These exchanges, often conducted through the Egmont Secure Web, facilitated collaborative investigations, asset tracing, and enforcement actions with partners such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and others.
The Egmont Group, which brings together financial intelligence units (FIUs) from over 170 jurisdictions, serves as a secure global forum for the confidential exchange of financial intelligence. Its platform is considered the backbone of transnational AML and counter-terrorist financing (CFT) efforts. Mexico and the United States, both prominent members, historically ranked among the highest users of this channel, especially in relation to cases involving drug trafficking, organized crime, and large-scale illicit financial flows.
Until 2024, the UIF’s public reports consistently detailed the number of outgoing and incoming information requests, often listing collaborating countries and the general nature of the cases. This openness was seen as a sign of Mexico’s commitment to international standards, such as those promoted by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and as a practical tool for demonstrating compliance to global peers and domestic stakeholders.
However, 2025 marks a striking departure. The UIF’s latest reports no longer break down this information, omitting details about the use of the Egmont platform and cross-border exchanges. While the total number of information transmissions remains undisclosed, previous years saw several hundred interactions—216 in 2024, 276 in 2023, and 198 in 2022, according to official UIF activity reports. The new opacity comes without explanation and leaves observers, both domestic and international, questioning the rationale and potential implications.
The US Crackdown and the New Anti-Fentanyl Law’s Ripple Effects
Mexico’s change in reporting occurs against a backdrop of escalating US enforcement measures targeting Mexican financial institutions suspected of facilitating illicit fentanyl and opioid proceeds. On June 25, 2025, the US Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued its first actions under new anti-fentanyl legislation, publicly identifying three Mexican banks—Intercam, CIBanco, and Vector—as significant channels for laundering opioid-related funds.
The US government’s move to classify certain Mexican criminal groups as terrorist organizations has elevated the urgency of bilateral AML cooperation. In practice, this designation triggers increased scrutiny and places a heavier burden on both the US and Mexican financial sectors to monitor, report, and block suspicious cross-border transactions linked to narcotics trafficking. Under these conditions, the regular exchange of actionable intelligence via the Egmont Group is more important than ever.
Historically, Mexico has ranked as a top partner for US financial intelligence requests, with dozens of inquiries each year focusing on cartel-related laundering, shell companies, and suspect wire transfers. For example, UIF data from recent years indicated Mexico responded to hundreds of requests from the United States alone, far exceeding its interactions with any other nation. This robust partnership is fundamental to both countries’ efforts to trace, freeze, and recover assets tied to organized crime.
The US crackdown, including new compliance expectations for foreign correspondent banks and cross-border financial services, may be indirectly influencing Mexico’s new stance on transparency. By limiting public disclosure of AML data, the UIF might be seeking to protect sensitive operational details, avoid reputational risks, or manage the diplomatic fallout of ongoing high-profile investigations.
How the Egmont Group Shapes AML Information Flows—and Why Mexico’s Silence Matters
The Egmont Group, founded in 1995 and headquartered in Belgium, functions as a secure international clearinghouse for financial intelligence. Each FIU within the group follows strict protocols for safeguarding sensitive information, ensuring that data shared through the Egmont Secure Web remains confidential and used solely for authorized investigations. The group’s principles are aligned with FATF Recommendation 29, which emphasizes timely and secure international cooperation as a core requirement for effective AML/CFT systems.
Through Egmont, Mexico has, over the years, facilitated a diverse array of requests concerning individuals, corporate structures, beneficial ownership, account flows, and high-value transactions. The bulk of requests traditionally originate from North American and European partners, reflecting the transnational nature of organized crime and the global reach of financial networks used by Mexican cartels.
Publicly available UIF reports until 2024 showed that the United States topped the list of both outgoing and incoming requests, followed by countries such as Andorra, Spain, the British Virgin Islands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Panama, Canada, and Hong Kong. These data points provided valuable insight into the international AML ecosystem and demonstrated Mexico’s proactive engagement with global enforcement trends.
Mexico’s new silence on these exchanges raises concerns among practitioners and analysts. The lack of disclosure makes it harder to assess the country’s level of cooperation, spot emerging risks, or gauge the effectiveness of its intelligence-led approach to financial crime. For partner FIUs, this opacity could complicate strategic planning and hinder efforts to target cross-border threats in a coordinated manner.
While Mexican authorities maintain that information shared via Egmont remains protected and that operational cooperation continues as required by law, the absence of detailed public reporting breaks with a tradition of transparency valued by FATF and the wider AML community. The move could also affect perceptions during Mexico’s next FATF mutual evaluation, where cooperation and information sharing are key areas of assessment.
Legal, Regulatory, and Strategic Implications of Mexico’s New Reporting Policy
Mexico’s AML/CFT legal framework is rooted in the Federal Law for the Prevention and Identification of Operations with Resources of Illicit Origin (Ley Federal para la Prevención e Identificación de Operaciones con Recursos de Procedencia Ilícita, or LFPIORPI), along with relevant provisions in the General Law of Credit Institutions and the National Banking and Securities Commission (CNBV) regulations. These laws mandate that the UIF collect, analyze, and exchange financial intelligence with domestic and international authorities in support of investigations and enforcement actions.
The transparency of such cooperation has historically served as a confidence-building measure for foreign partners and as evidence of compliance with international norms. Mexico’s voluntary participation in FATF peer reviews and its regular publication of UIF activity reports have been cited as best practices in regional AML/CFT capacity building.
A decision to restrict the publication of information on international intelligence exchanges does not, on its own, imply a reduction in actual cooperation. The UIF is still legally obligated to respond to qualified requests from its foreign counterparts and to provide data as required by treaties, memoranda of understanding, and Egmont protocols. Nonetheless, from a risk management perspective, the lack of visible accountability may weaken deterrence, slow detection of systemic threats, and erode trust among law enforcement partners.
For financial institutions operating in Mexico or engaging in cross-border business with Mexican entities, the new policy introduces additional uncertainty. Compliance officers and risk managers rely on trends and statistics from UIF reports to calibrate transaction monitoring systems, inform customer due diligence procedures, and benchmark their own reporting performance. The absence of granular public data may force institutions to rely more heavily on internal data and less on the broader risk environment.
Internationally, regulators and supranational bodies such as FATF, the Egmont Group, and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision have emphasized that transparency in AML/CFT efforts, including public reporting of aggregate statistics, plays a critical role in deterring financial crime and maintaining market integrity. The shift in Mexico’s reporting practices may prompt calls for clarification or adjustment during future mutual evaluations and peer reviews.
Conclusion: The Future of Money Laundering Transparency and International Cooperation in Mexico
Mexico’s unexpected decision to withhold detailed information about its international AML/CFT information-sharing practices marks a significant change in both policy and tone. While the underlying legal and operational cooperation mechanisms remain in place, the move toward greater secrecy signals caution and may reflect shifting priorities in the face of increasing regulatory and political pressures.
As US authorities continue to intensify their scrutiny of Mexican financial institutions under new anti-fentanyl and anti-terrorism laws, the need for robust, transparent, and timely information exchange has never been greater. The Egmont Group and other international networks remain essential for coordinating responses to money laundering and related threats, but the lack of public reporting from Mexico could undermine confidence and hinder collective action.
Ultimately, how Mexico balances operational confidentiality with the need for transparency will be closely watched by global AML professionals, regulators, and financial institutions alike. The country’s next steps may set a precedent for other jurisdictions facing similar tensions between disclosure, national security, and the imperatives of international cooperation.
Related Links
- Egmont Group: Official Website
- Financial Action Task Force (FATF): Mexico Mutual Evaluation Report
- Mexico’s UIF (Financial Intelligence Unit): Official Publications
- US FinCEN: Anti-Fentanyl Actions
- Ley Federal para la Prevención e Identificación de Operaciones con Recursos de Procedencia Ilícita
Other FinCrime Central Articles About Mexico
- US Treasury Sanctions Mexican Banks CIBanco, Intercam, Vector in Fentanyl Money Laundering Crackdown
- US Designation of Cartels as Terrorist Organizations Increases Risk of Doing Business in Mexico
- The Dark Side of Banking: Money Laundering Inside One of the World’s Most Powerful Banks
Source: El Siglo de Durango
Some of FinCrime Central’s articles may have been enriched or edited with the help of AI tools. It may contain unintentional errors.
Want to promote your brand with us or need some help selecting the right solution or the right advisory firm? Email us at info@fincrimecentral.com; we probably have the right contact for you.
