Credit Suisse faces intensified scrutiny after Swiss prosecutors issued an indictment centered on money movements linked to the Mozambique loan transactions. The case outlines how funds tied to the 2013 state-guaranteed financing entered accounts at the former bank and were later transferred abroad despite indicators of criminal origin. Prosecutors describe a chain of decisions that allowed suspicious transfers to proceed without timely reporting to the Money Laundering Reporting Office of Switzerland. The indictment highlights the role of internal investigations and their shortcomings, setting the stage for judicial review. Swiss authorities now move the matter toward court while maintaining the presumption of innocence for all defendants.

Money Laundering Failures Connected to Mozambique Loans

Swiss prosecutors describe a sequence of transactions that raised clear concerns about the origins of funds linked to Mozambican state-guaranteed loans. The loans were arranged in 2013 for three state-owned entities and later became widely known as part of the Mozambique Debt Scandal. By 2016, the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland had begun receiving information suggesting that related fees and transfers could involve misconduct in Mozambique. This suspicion intensified when a foreign company holding accounts at the former Credit Suisse received approximately USD 7.86 million from Mozambique’s Ministry of Economy and Finance.

The funds stemmed from what investigators call a running fee paid for services allegedly related to the loans. The indictment states that the fee was obtained or facilitated through misconduct committed in Mozambique, including bribery of public officials and violations of duties associated with publicly guaranteed financing. Once the funds were credited, USD 7 million was quickly transferred to the United Arab Emirates, prompting enquiries within the bank. These enquiries occurred as the bank assessed whether the money might reflect unlawful conduct connected to the loan transactions.

Swiss prosecutors argue that the commercial relationship presented numerous warning signs. The account holder’s corporate structure, its role in earlier loan-related matters, and the sources of the incoming funds prompted the bank to examine the relationship. The indictment asserts that despite these factors, the investigation inside the institution did not meet the level of scrutiny expected under Swiss anti-money laundering obligations. Prosecutors state that instead of reporting the concerns to the Money Laundering Reporting Office Switzerland, the bank ultimately chose to terminate the relationship. This decision permitted the remaining suspicious funds to be transferred abroad in the autumn of 2016.

Deficiencies Highlighted in Internal Investigations

The indictment focuses on the actions of a compliance officer who, according to prosecutors, played a key role in the enquiries conducted after the transfer of USD 7 million. The officer has been charged with money laundering under Article 305bis of the Swiss Criminal Code. Prosecutors claim that while assessing the commercial relationship, she was aware of indicators pointing to possible criminal origins of the funds. These indicators included the background of the Mozambican transactions, the internal risk assessments already conducted by the bank, and the unusual nature of the payments.

Swiss prosecutors contend that she recommended against filing a report with the Money Laundering Reporting Office Switzerland. Instead, she suggested ending the bank’s relationship with the account holder. The indictment argues that this recommendation, combined with inadequate investigation steps, enabled the remaining funds to leave the institution. The amounts transferred abroad included approximately USD 609,000 and CHF 28,000 still held at the bank following the initial departure of USD 7 million.

Prosecutors say that this conduct resulted in the movement of money suspected to be of criminal origin, forming the basis of the money laundering charge. They also highlight the officer’s responsibility to ensure adequate due diligence under Swiss law and the internal directives governing financial crime controls. The decision to close the account without filing a suspicious transaction report is described by prosecutors as a failure to implement the reporting duties established in Swiss AML legislation. The case further illustrates how a gap in internal decision-making allowed funds to exit Switzerland without being escalated to the national reporting office.

Organisational Failures Within the Banking Group

Alongside the charge against the individual compliance officer, Swiss prosecutors have charged Credit Suisse, its former parent company, and their successor entities UBS SA and UBS Group SA. The indictment alleges that the financial group did not take required organisational steps to prevent the alleged money laundering. Under Article 102 of the Swiss Criminal Code, companies can be held criminally liable if inadequate organisation enables an offence.

Prosecutors state that in 2016 the bank’s risk management, compliance governance, and internal directives contained significant shortcomings. These shortcomings led to the handling of the Mozambique-linked investigation with insufficient care. The indictment highlights the delayed suspicious transaction report, which was not filed until 2019, after the United States Department of Justice publicly confirmed its own proceedings related to the loan transactions. Swiss authorities argue that if the organisation had been more robust, the suspicious nature of the funds would have been escalated in 2016 rather than years later.

The indictment describes how the second internal investigation launched by Swiss authorities in 2023 drew on findings from earlier proceedings opened in 2020. Those earlier proceedings focus on natural persons suspected of money laundering and complicity in the bribery of foreign officials. The organisational charges against the bank emphasise systemic weaknesses rather than individual intent. Prosecutors assert that these weaknesses created conditions allowing money suspected of illicit origin to pass through the institution without timely reporting.

The transfer of funds linked to publicly guaranteed loans and the corruption allegations surrounding the Mozambique Debt Scandal intensify the seriousness of the case. Swiss authorities argue that the bank’s internal processes should have detected and escalated these indicators. By charging the successor companies UBS SA and UBS Group SA, prosecutors ensure corporate accountability remains in place despite the 2023 takeover. The presumption of innocence remains for all entities until a final judgment is issued.

How the Case Moves Forward

Swiss authorities abandoned proceedings against a second defendant who had oversight responsibility during the relevant period. This individual had already been convicted in March 2025 by the Federal Department of Finance for violating reporting duties under the Anti-Money Laundering Act. That decision is under appeal before the Federal Criminal Court. Prosecutors determined that continuing parallel criminal proceedings would not serve procedural efficiency. As a result, the case will now progress with the remaining defendants.

The Federal Criminal Court will oversee the upcoming phases, including potential hearings, public updates, and sentencing proposals. As customary in Swiss criminal procedure, the Office of the Attorney General will present its positions at the appropriate stage. The indictment underscores how unresolved governance weaknesses can allow funds suspected of corruption to move across borders. This case also shows how failures to report, delayed investigations, and gaps in oversight contribute to the movement of proceeds that prosecutors believe arise from bribery and misconduct in Mozambique.

The matter now advances to judicial review, where prosecutors will outline their evidence and the defence will present counterarguments. As set out in Swiss law, all defendants benefit from full procedural rights and the presumption of innocence. The case highlights the role of reporting duties in preventing illicit flows and illustrates the risks that emerge when warning signs are not escalated promptly. The movement of the Mozambique-linked funds demonstrates how gaps in investigation and organisational control can create channels for illicit proceeds to transit through the financial system.

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Key Points

• Funds linked to Mozambique’s state-guaranteed loans were transferred through accounts at the former Credit Suisse
• Prosecutors allege the funds originated from misconduct involving bribery and public sector violations in Mozambique
• A compliance officer is charged with money laundering for allowing the remaining funds to be transferred abroad
• Corporate charges target organisational deficiencies under Swiss criminal law
• Authorities emphasise delayed reporting and inadequate internal investigations

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Related Links

• FATF Switzerland Mutual Evaluation Report
• Swiss Federal Department of Finance AMLA Information
• Swiss Criminal Code Article 305bis
• Swiss Criminal Procedure Code Information
• Federal Criminal Court of Switzerland

Other FinCrime Central Articles About Credit Suisse And the Tuna Bonds Case

• Former Credit Suisse VP and 2 MDs Banned for Life From Working in any UK Regulated Financial Service Activity
• Swiss Prosecutor Rocks Credit Suisse Acquittal in Landmark Money Laundering Appeal
• Ex-Credit Suisse Executive Fined CHF 100,000 for Money Laundering Role in Mozambique Scandal

Source: Swiss Federal Authorities

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