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How Iran’s Oil Smuggling Network Exploits Maritime Loopholes

iran iranian oil smugglung shadow fleet sanctions evasion

A sweeping move by the U.S. Department of the Treasury has brought to light one of the most extensive Iranian oil smuggling operations to date, linking a complex web of companies and vessels to a UAE-based Indian national. Jugwinder Singh Brar is now at the center of a sanctions action revealing how Iran continues to exploit global maritime systems to bypass long-standing restrictions on its petroleum exports.

Brar’s operations, which stretch across the United Arab Emirates and India, rely on nearly 30 vessels conducting covert activities. These ships form part of Iran’s infamous “shadow fleet”—a concealed network that transports sanctioned petroleum using deceptive maritime tactics designed to evade detection. This development is the latest in a growing list of efforts by Iranian actors to maintain a flow of oil revenue despite mounting international pressure.

Frequent flag switching: Iranian-affiliated tankers have increasingly registered under flags of convenience, often from countries with limited regulatory oversight such as Palau, the Cook Islands, and the Comoros.
AIS manipulation: Vessels disable or spoof their Automatic Identification System (AIS) signals, either disappearing from trackers entirely or broadcasting false locations thousands of miles away.
Vessel name changes and repainting: In a growing trend, tankers are renamed and repainted multiple times during their lifespan, frustrating port authorities and maritime observers attempting to link them to known Iranian fleets.
Deceptive documentation and blending schemes: Iranian petroleum is blended with oil from other countries—typically Iraq or the UAE—and shipped with falsified documents that list incorrect origins.

This constellation of tactics enables Iranian oil to enter legitimate markets, sold at higher prices under the guise of non-sanctioned supply.

Brar’s companies—Prime Tankers LLC and Glory International FZ-LLC in the UAE, and Global Tankers Private Limited and B and P Solutions Private Limited in India—are instrumental in enabling this activity. Many of Brar’s vessels engage in ship-to-ship (STS) transfers with Iranian tankers in the Gulf of Oman, off the coast of Iraq, and near the UAE. These high-risk operations occur often under cover of darkness or while AIS systems are turned off, making enforcement efforts difficult.

A Deepening Network of Illicit Transfers and Military Links

The U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Brar under Executive Order 13902, which targets individuals and entities in Iran’s petroleum sector. OFAC also sanctioned his associated companies, identifying them as vehicles for facilitating oil sales on behalf of Iran’s state-run National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and the country’s military.

Among the tankers in Brar’s fleet are GLOBAL BEAUTY, GLOBAL EAGLE, and GLOBAL ELEGANCE, all of which were contracted in 2024 to provide bunkering services to ships operating in Iranian waters. These vessels were involved in coordinated operations with the NIOC, already sanctioned for materially supporting the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), Iran’s elite military unit responsible for foreign paramilitary operations.

In mid-2023, one of Brar’s vessels, GLOBAL ELEGANCE, received over 10,000 metric tons of petroleum via a ship-to-ship transfer from a vessel owned by the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC). The operation was orchestrated with MODAFL front companies Sahara Thunder and Asia Marine Crown Agency—both recently sanctioned for aiding Iran’s defense sector.

OFAC’s findings also reveal that between February and November 2022, Brar-owned tankers such as GLOBAL EMERALD, GLOBAL PEAK, and GLOBAL STAR transported over 25,000 metric tons of petroleum products from Bandar Abbas, Iran, to Oman and the UAE. These shipments were then transshipped to Iraq’s Khor al-Zubair port where Iranian oil was blended with Iraqi products. The resulting cargoes were shipped under fraudulent documents labeling them as Iraqi-origin oil—significantly boosting Iran’s revenues by circumventing price reductions typically applied to sanctioned petroleum.

Systematic Shell Companies and Global Port Hopping

The extent of concealment goes well beyond the ships themselves. Brar’s operation involves a tangled web of front companies and brokers that conceal ultimate beneficial ownership and avoid scrutiny. Ships are registered under different holding structures in the UAE, India, and offshore jurisdictions, making it difficult for global regulators to trace transactions back to their Iranian source.

This strategy echoes other high-profile Iranian smuggling schemes in recent years, which have seen vessels making indirect port calls in Southeast Asia, East Africa, and even South America before delivering oil to refineries in China or processing hubs in India. These detours help launder Iranian-origin cargo through legitimate shipping routes.

To maintain this elaborate deception, facilitators rely on falsified bills of lading, forged certificates of origin, and other documents that accompany cargoes through customs systems. In many cases, enforcement bodies only discover these deceptions after-the-fact, when investigative reports link the ships to known Iranian networks or sanctioned entities.

Sanctions Impact and U.S. Strategic Objectives

As part of the most recent enforcement action, OFAC designated over two dozen vessels as blocked property under Executive Order 13902. These include ships flagged in Barbados, Panama, the Cook Islands, Antigua and Barbuda, and Palau—demonstrating how Iran uses a global patchwork of maritime registries to obscure vessel ownership and operations.

The sanctions freeze all U.S.-linked property and interests associated with these ships and prohibit U.S. persons from engaging in transactions with them. Entities holding 50% or more ownership by Brar or his affiliates are also automatically considered blocked, regardless of whether they are explicitly listed.

In parallel, the U.S. State Department designated four additional companies involved in knowingly engaging in significant transactions involving Iranian petroleum. Two vessels were also identified as blocked property belonging to those firms.

The actions come amid broader geopolitical tension and are part of Washington’s maximum pressure campaign aimed at dismantling Iran’s oil-based revenue streams that support its nuclear and military programs.

Conclusion: Red Flags for Global Traders and Compliance Officers

The unraveling of Brar’s smuggling empire should serve as a warning to shipping companies, commodity traders, and global ports. Sanctions enforcement is tightening, and the U.S. has signaled that it will continue aggressively targeting facilitators—both direct and indirect—of Iranian petroleum exports.

Iran’s ongoing efforts to maintain a shadow fleet represent one of the most sophisticated sanctions-evasion programs in the world. The tactics are constantly evolving, blending legal ambiguity with flagrant deception. For compliance professionals and regulatory authorities, vigilance must now extend beyond vessel tracking to include deep analysis of ownership structures, voyage history, and transaction records.

As the stakes grow higher, global collaboration will be vital to disrupting Iran’s shadow fleet, ensuring that international markets are not exploited by regimes seeking to evade accountability.