French and Italian Police Smash International Money Laundering Network Moving Millions in Gold

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30 million euros laundered between France and Italy and the discovery of 55 gold bullions revealed the scale of a criminal operation that turned drug trafficking profits into precious metals before exporting them through Kosovo and Turkey. The network was coordinated by individuals of Kosovar and Middle Eastern origin who oversaw an intricate system of cash collection, transport, and transformation into physical assets. The case, initiated by intelligence from Milan’s financial investigators at the end of 2024, became a joint French–Italian operation involving hundreds of officers and the support of judicial authorities.

International money laundering networks exposed

Large volumes of cash were collected in Marseille, Lyon, Paris, and other urban centers before being transported to Italy. Syrian and Maghrebian teams managed the physical smuggling, using cars fitted with sophisticated hidden compartments to evade detection. Once the money reached Milan, it was systematically converted into gold bars, a method chosen for its portability, liquidity, and ability to obscure illicit origins. From there, the gold was exported to Kosovo and Turkey, exploiting the dense gold markets in those regions, where enforcement gaps and high trade volumes create opportunities for laundering.

The scale of the operation underlines the adaptability of organized crime. Despite years of regulatory tightening in the banking sector, networks continue to exploit physical channels and commodity markets to recycle illicit value. By combining traditional bulk cash smuggling with modern logistical precision, the network created an efficient laundering pipeline that stretched across multiple jurisdictions.

Drug trafficking as the financial engine

At the heart of the case was narcotics trafficking. The laundering network was directly tied to groups already known to French authorities, including the DZ Mafia from Marseille, which has longstanding involvement in drug supply and distribution. The proceeds of drug sales generated liquidity on a weekly basis, requiring immediate laundering to avoid exposure. Between October 2024 and August 2025, the network handled cash collections estimated at more than 30 million euros.

Investigators tracked how weekly pick-ups occurred in Marseille and its suburbs, then extended to Lyon, Paris, and regions of northern Italy. The cash was transported in carefully modified vehicles, sometimes carrying hundreds of thousands of euros at a time. Couriers followed precise schedules to maintain a steady flow, a hallmark of organized laundering tied directly to predictable drug market revenues.

Once across the border, the cash was exchanged for gold through complicit dealers or intermediaries. Gold has long been favored by drug trafficking organizations because it consolidates value, reduces detection risk, and can be sold in high-liquidity markets like Istanbul or Pristina. The 55 one-kilogram gold bars seized during the investigation represented a fraction of what had likely already moved through the system undetected. With gold prices stable and easily monetized, the conversion offered both security and profitability for criminal organizers.

The discovery of links to the DZ Mafia was significant. Several of the couriers identified had past records for narcotics offenses, and some were suspected of managing parallel drug supply chains. By embedding laundering operations directly into the narcotics economy, the network minimized reliance on outsiders and ensured that illicit profits remained within the group’s control. This synergy between trafficking and laundering allowed the network to expand quickly while remaining resilient against infiltration.

Cash smuggling and gold conversion

Cash smuggling remained the operational backbone of the scheme. Syrian and Maghrebian groups were tasked with concealing funds in vehicles, often using engineering expertise to create hidden compartments capable of bypassing inspections. This layer of the network functioned with military precision, with convoys scheduled to move across borders on specific dates, sometimes toward Spain, sometimes toward northern Italy. On September 7, investigators intercepted one such convoy, leading to the seizure of 55 kilograms of gold and more than 2.4 million euros in cash. Seven people were arrested in this operation and placed in pre-trial detention.

Just weeks later, on September 23, coordinated raids across Marseille, Vitrolles, Marignane, Martigues, and Italian cities netted twelve more arrests. The raids uncovered an additional 219,000 euros in cash, five vehicles, luxury handbags, watches, and jewelry. These seizures confirmed the diversification of laundering channels: not only gold, but also high-value goods that can be resold or transferred abroad with minimal detection.

The choice of Kosovo and Turkey as destinations for the gold reflects a calculated strategy. Both regions have vibrant gold markets, high transaction volumes, and a mix of formal and informal trade networks. Kosovo, with its geographic position in the Balkans, offers access to regional markets where regulatory oversight varies widely. Turkey, meanwhile, hosts one of the largest gold markets globally, where bullion can be sold quickly and reintegrated into legitimate commercial flows. By moving gold into these jurisdictions, the network created multiple exit points for illicit value, making it nearly impossible for investigators to follow once the gold was melted, recast, or sold into wholesale markets.

The use of gold as a laundering tool has been extensively documented in past cases. Bars can be melted, alloyed, or converted into jewelry, erasing serial numbers and obliterating provenance. Once transformed, the gold is indistinguishable from legitimate supply, allowing criminal proceeds to re-enter the economy disguised as trade. The Marseille–Milan case illustrates this typology in stark detail, combining cash smuggling, commodity conversion, and cross-border export into a single laundering conveyor belt.

Wider impact on AML enforcement

This case highlights the growing importance of physical laundering channels at a time when digital transactions are under greater scrutiny. While financial institutions in Europe operate under stringent AML directives, the precious metals sector remains vulnerable. Dealers, refiners, and jewelry manufacturers are often subject to due diligence requirements, but enforcement is inconsistent, and monitoring is weaker than in banking. Criminal groups exploit these weaknesses, leveraging the anonymity of commodity transactions to bypass traditional suspicious activity reporting.

For enforcement agencies, the success of this case was due to unprecedented cooperation. The joint investigative team between France and Italy allowed intelligence to flow seamlessly, enabling both the interception of convoys and the execution of simultaneous raids. The seizure of over 2.6 million euros in cash, 55 kilograms of gold, and luxury assets sends a strong message, but the broader implication is clear: without international collaboration, networks that span France, Italy, Kosovo, and Turkey would remain untouchable.

For compliance professionals, several lessons emerge. First, vigilance must extend beyond financial institutions to cover dealers in precious metals and luxury goods. Second, monitoring must account for physical smuggling, where patterns of movement and trade anomalies reveal risks invisible to transaction-based systems. Third, enhanced scrutiny of cross-border trade flows to high-risk jurisdictions is essential, particularly where commodities like gold are involved.

Ultimately, while authorities disrupted this network, the laundering methodologies it used remain active globally. Gold, luxury goods, and physical cash will continue to serve as conduits for illicit value until AML frameworks fully align across sectors and jurisdictions. The Marseille–Milan case demonstrates both the progress made and the distance still to go.


Source: ici (formerly France Bleu, article in French)

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